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“YOU’RE FIRED!” WHY THE ALJ MULTI-TRACK
DUAL REMOVAL PROVISIONS VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION AND POSSIBLE FIXES
Linda D. Jellum*

INTRODUCTION
When you light fireworks, you look forward to the ensuing explosion.
Sometimes, however, all you get is a fizzle. Such was the outcome of the
highly anticipated 1 case of Lucia v. SEC. 2 This case held that the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) 3 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) were inferior officers who must be constitutionally appointed. 4 This
holding was hardly surprising, 5 especially given the Solicitor General’s decision to switch sides after Lucia’s petition was filed with the Supreme
Court. 6 Indeed, the Court had to appoint Amicus Curiae Anton Metlitsky to

* Ellison Capers Palmer Sr. Professor of Tax Law, Mercer University School of Law. I would like
to thank Director Adam White for inviting me to participate in the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study
of the Administrative State’s and George Mason Law Review’s project on “Agency Adjudications and
the Rule of Law.” Special thanks to Professors Richard Pierce, Michael Asimow, and Michael Greve for
their thoughtful insights. My research assistant, Caitlin Wise, J.D. expected 2019, did a tremendous job
reviewing, cite-checking, and laughing at my work. This Article builds on my prior co-authored piece:
Linda D. Jellum & Moses Tincher, The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange Commission’s Administrative Law Judges, 70 SMU L. REV. 3 (2017). However, this
Article is more comprehensive, approaches the topic differently, and evaluates potential solutions.
1 See, e.g., Margaret Newkirk & Greg Stohr, Trump’s War on ‘Deep State’ Judges, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-20/supreme-court-lucia-case-could-remove-agency-judge-protections (“In a Supreme Court docket full of big
cases, Lucia ‘may be the sleeper,’ says Brianne Gorod, chief counsel for the Constitutional Accountability
Center, a liberal think tank in Washington . . . Judge Carlos Lucero of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
wrote that the effort to attach the officer designation ‘threatens to unravel much of our modern regulatory
framework’ and ‘places the legitimacy of our administrative agencies in serious doubt.’”).
2 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
3 See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Neither Party
at 8, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17−130) (“The vast majority of ALJs, 1,655 out of 1,926,
work for the Social Security Administration (SSA) . . . Agencies like the SEC routinely hire ALJs who
have previously worked for SSA. Thus, the initial appointment of an ALJ is usually made by SSA from
the list of eligible applicants created by OPM. Other agencies then choose ALJs from the large population
of ALJs who work for SSA.”)
4 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
5 See Linda D. Jellum & Moses M. Tincher, The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange Commission’s Administrative Law Judges, 70 SMU L. REV. 3, 31–34
(2017) (arguing that SEC ALJs were inferior officers who were unconstitutionally appointed).
6 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050.
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argue the SEC’s original position that the SEC ALJs were merely employees. 7
While Metlitsky did his best, 8 the argument was a loser from the start.
Supreme Court precedent had already granted inferior officer status on many
a lesser functionary, 9 including a district court clerk, 10 a federal marshal, 11
and, most relevantly in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12 Tax
Court special trial judges. 13 In fact, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Lucia
could simply have said, “SEC ALJs are inferior officers, duh. See our unanimous, did I mention unanimous?, decision in Freytag.” 14
Of course, Justice Kagan was more eloquent than that, but her opinion
was crafted extremely narrowly. Despite Metlitsky and the government’s request that the Court more clearly define the “significant authority” element
of officer status, Justice Kagan declined, saying simply that “our precedent[]
makes that project unnecessary.” 15 Had such guidance been offered, there
might be no question who else might be an inferior officer. Instead, Justice
Kagan minimized Lucia’s impact by resting entirely on stare decisis. 16 Fizzle
number one.
Fizzle number two: Justice Kagan correctly sidestepped the gamechanging issue of whether the multi-track, statutory removal restrictions on
SEC ALJs violate the United States Constitution. 17 When granting certiorari,
the Court refused to include the removal issue. 18 Despite this refusal, the Solicitor General asked the Court to address the issue in its merits brief. 19 The

7

Id. at 2051 n.2.
Id. (“Anton Metlitsky . . . has ably discharged his responsibilities.”).
9 The Court has found various examples of inferior officers. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651, 666 (1997) (military judges); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 182 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (military judges); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (independent counsel); GoBart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931) (United States commissioner in district
court proceedings); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (postmaster first class); Rice v. Ames,
180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (extradition commissioners); United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898)
(vice consul temporarily exercising the duties of a consul); United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594–95
(1895) (“commissioners of the Circuit Courts”); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484 (1886) (“cadet-engineer”); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397–98 (1879) (election supervisor); United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879) (“thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior,
and the others”); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762 (1878) (“assistant-surgeon”).
10 Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839).
11 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397–98.
12 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
13 Id. at 881–82.
14 This decision would have been even more obvious had the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia not misinterpreted Freytag.
15 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
16 Administrative judges are one example.
17 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050–51 n.1.
18 Id.
19 See Brief for the Respondent at 21, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018) (No. 17-130).
8
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Court again declined, politely saying, “No court has addressed that question,
and we ordinarily await ‘thorough lower court opinions to guide our analysis
of the merits.’” 20
With the removal issue appropriately sidestepped, the fizzle was complete. As Professor Andy Popper noted with some confusion, “[Lucia] was
supposed to be the biggest ad law decision of the last decade.” 21 Yes, supposed to be; however, stay tuned. The question of the constitutionality of the
ALJ removal limitations is coming. Indeed, on November 28, 2018, Raymond J. Lucia, Co. filed a new complaint alleging that “[t]hese multiple layers of tenure protection violate Article II of the United States Constitution.” 22
And, the potential ramifications are enormous. Insert explosion here!
Given that it is only a matter of time before this removal issue reaches
the Supreme Court, this Article explains why the ALJ removal structure violates Article II of the United States Constitution and separation of powers.
Moreover, unlike cases in which the courts have found removal provisions
violate the Constitution and have severed the offending provisions, 23 here,
there is no easy fix. Federal statute 5 U.S.C § 7521 protects ALJs from atwill removal, reductions in pay or pay grade, suspensions, and furloughs. 24 It
applies to all ALJs who are appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105. 25 Hence, the
Court’s holding has the potential to affect all ALJs: those working for independent agencies (hereinafter “Independent ALJs”) and those working for
executive agencies (hereinafter “Executive ALJs”). 26
ALJs are central to the work that federal agencies do. ALJs hold administrative hearings and make initial decisions on topics ranging from environmental violations to black lung benefits. 27 ALJs are “judicial workhorses,
handling five times as many cases—more than 1.5 million a year, according
to the administrative judiciary’s estimate—as are filed in federal district
court.” 28 Without ALJs, the administrative piece of the adjudicative state

20

Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050–51 n.1 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012)).
E-mail from Andrew Popper, Ann Loeb Bronfman Distinguished Professor of Law & Gov’t, Am.
Univ. Washington Coll. of Law, to author (June 21, 2018, 2:24 PM) (on file with author).
22 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21, Raymond J. Lucia Co. v. SEC, No.
18CV2692DMSJLB (S.D. Calif. (November 28, 2018)).
23 See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010)
(severing the unconstitutional removal provision from the remainder of the act); PHH Corp. v. Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (recommending severability of the unconstitutional removal provision).
24 5 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (2012).
25 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
26 These are my terms. Because the removal structure differs depending on the type of agency,
distinguishing between the two is sometimes necessary.
27 See e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 457 (2001); Energy West
Mining Co. v. Oliver, 555 F.3d 1211, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 2009).
28 Newkirk & Stohr, supra note 1.
21
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could fall apart. Thus, removal may be the most important administrative law
issue to be resolved in the coming years.
Currently, ALJs are protected from at-will removal by multiple statutes
delineating a difficult removal process. 29 In short, ALJs have for-cause removal protection, as do many of those who would remove them. 30 This multitrack removal protection system was put into place for a very good reason:
to protect the independence of ALJs, who are employees of the agencies for
which they work. 31 Prior to Congress enacting the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), many individuals criticized examiners, as they were called
then, as biased arms of their agencies. 32 As a result, Congress put the removal
protections in place to help insulate ALJs from their employing agencies and
further impartiality.33 While promoting ALJ independence and impartiality
is certainly desirable, the provisions of the APA must still comport with Article II and separation of powers. However, the Supreme Court has held that
just two levels of tenure protection violate the Constitution. 34 In the case of
ALJs, there is a “Matryoshka doll of tenure protections.” 35
This Article explains why the for-cause removal provisions for ALJs are
unconstitutional and offers three potential solutions to remedy this problem.
Part I provides background information, which explains that the APA was a
compromise of competing interests. Some wanted ALJs to be completely independent from their agencies to further unbiased decision-making and independence, and others feared agencies would lose control over setting policy,
should ALJs have such an independent function. 36 Ultimately, Congress compromised by including provisions to make the ALJs more independent, while
also ensuring that agencies retained complete control to set policy.37
As part of the independence piece of the compromise, ALJs would
henceforth be removable only for cause. 38 Further, to remove an ALJ, an
agency, whose members might also be removable only for cause, had to make
its case during a formal hearing before a different ALJ, who was removable
only for cause and worked for a separate agency, whose members were also
only removable for cause. 39 In short, the process Congress created involves
multiple levels of for-cause protection. 40

29

See discussion infra Part I.B.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)–(b)(1) (2012).
31 See discussion infra Part I.A.
32 See discussion infra Part I.A.
33 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 92-7, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY, at 8 (1992).
34 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010).
35 Id. at 497.
36 See discussion infra Part I.A.
37 See discussion infra Part I.A.
38 5 U.S.C. 7521(a) (2012).
39 See discussion infra Part I.B.
40 See discussion infra Part I.B.
30
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Next, Part II of this Article points out that the Constitution does not
expressly provide the President with removal power; however, such power
has been located within Article II and separation of powers. 41 Specifically,
the Supreme Court early on presumed the President had removal power because the framers of the Constitution did not explicitly take it away.42 Building on the understanding that the President’s removal power is implicit in the
Constitution, Part III details the Supreme Court cases that have addressed
removal. Unfortunately, as Part III suggests, the Court has not been consistent in this area, but then again, that is nothing new these days.
Though the Court’s decisions have been inconsistent, its precedents
show a definite pattern. The Court began the discussion with an expansive
view of the President’s removal power that Congress could not easily restrict. 43 Removal limitations would not be implied, and the Court made clear
it would only tolerate limitations on appointing authorities other than the
President. 44 Then, coinciding with the arrival of the first independent agencies, the Court backtracked in a series of cases. First, the Court decided to
allow Congress to restrict the President’s removal power regarding officers
having quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions; 45 however, this distinction was hard to maintain. Most agency officials have multiple powers. So,
the Court decided to allow Congress to restrict the President’s power to remove purely executive, inferior officers so long as the President’s ability to
faithfully execute the laws remained unimpeded. 46 With these cases, the Supreme Court’s test had morphed. The type of power was no longer relevant;
rather, the President’s ability to control the officer became determinative. 47
But even this new test was short-lived. Judicial hostility towards restrictions
on presidential removal powers returned. While the Court has not yet returned to its earlier expansive view of the President’s removal power, Part III
of this Article concludes by discussing the views of the two newest appointments to the Court, and predicts that the Court is certainly headed in that
direction. 48
In Part IV, this Article explains why the multi-track removal provisions
protecting ALJs are unconstitutional, even if their purpose is meritorious, and
perhaps even necessary. 49 Given that the Supreme Court has held that dual

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

See discussion infra Part II.
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 126–27 (1926).
See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–29 (1935).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690–91 (1988).
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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for-cause removal provisions are unconstitutional, it does not take a math
major to conclude that more than dual for-cause removal provisions are also
unconstitutional. Hence, the Court will likely hold 5 U.S.C. § 7521 unconstitutional, because the statutory scheme creates multiple dual for-cause removal protections. 50
Assuming this assumption is correct and the Supreme Court is likely to
hold 5 U.S.C. § 7521 unconstitutional, and that protecting ALJ independence
within constitutional constraints is a worthy endeavor, one might ask, how
can the Court resolve this mess? Part IV of this Article considers three possible solutions, none of which is perfect.51 First, the removal protection that
applies to all civil service employees could similarly protect ALJs. Second,
the Court could narrow Humphrey’s Executor 52 to hold that Congress can
limit a President’s power to remove principal officers who exercise adjudicatory powers exclusively. Third, the Court could overrule Humphrey’s Executor entirely and hold that Congress cannot limit a President’s power to
remove any principal officer. This Article explains the pluses and minuses of
each. Finally this Article concludes by offering some thoughts about the impact this issue will have on those attempting to dismantle the administrative
state. 53
I.

THE APA AND THE FOR-CAUSE REMOVAL PROVISIONS OF ALJS

Before the APA was enacted, the public expressed significant concern
that hearing examiners—as ALJs were then called—were not impartially
presiding over agency hearings; rather, the examiners acted as the arms of
the agency. 54 The public demanded independence. 55 However, agencies argued that they needed to maintain control over their hearing examiners in
order to control policymaking. 56 With the APA, Congress implemented protections to safeguard both of these competing interests. Part I of this Article
details Congress’s compromise.

50

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
52 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
53 See discussion infra Part IV.
54 See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953); Change of Title to Administrative Law Judge, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972) (now codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 930B).
55 See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 131.
56 See Paul R. Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2 ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 770, 801–02 (1992).
51

2019]

A.

“YOU’RE FIRED!”

711

The APA Compromise

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, agencies used “examiners” 57
to preside over their hearings. Agencies hired examiners directly, often as a
result of cronyism, 58 then controlled their assignments, compensation, promotions, and retention. 59 Further, examiners could not issue final or binding
decisions; the agency had final decision-making authority, 60 which is still true
today. 61 In short, examiners were “mere tools of the agency.” 62
By the 1930s, the public raised concerns about the ability of these hearing examiners to decide cases fairly, independently, and impartially under
the system then in place. 63 Members of Congress received multiple complaints that these examiners were biased in favor of the agency and against
private parties. 64 These bias concerns suggested that some examiner independence was essential. Yet, if examiners were too independent from the
agency that employed them, the agencies might lose control of policymaking.
Where to draw the line was a question Congress struggled with for fifteen
years.

57

The term “examiners” came into use in 1906. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 17.11 (2d ed. 1980). In 1972, the examiners’ title was changed to ALJ. Change of Title to
Administrative Law Judge, 37 Fed. Reg. at 16,787.
58 An ABA Report concluded that:
[A]ppointments to administrative tribunals are all too generally classed as patronage and, it is
to be feared, the decisions of some of them are occasionally dealt with as a form of patronage.
It is not easy to maintain judicial independence or high standards of judicial conduct when a
political sword of Damocles continually threatens the judge's source of livelihood. While a
few federal administrative tribunals have, in spite of all obstacles, preserved a high degree of
independence from political pressure and political considerations, unfortunately there are others which have yielded and as a result the cause of justice has suffered.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 57 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 539, 546 (1934);
see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33
ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111 (1981).
59 See Malcolm Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65 JUDICATURE
246, 246 (1981) (“The agencies controlled the compensation and job tenure of their hearing officers and
could ignore their decisions and enter de novo rulings instead.”); Verkuil et al., supra note 56, at 801.
60 Lubbers, supra note 58, at 111 (“Furthermore, the role of the presiding officer in an agency’s
decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would ignore the officer's decisions without giving
reasons, and enter their own de novo decisions.”).
61 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“On appeal from or review of the initial
decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision . . . ”).
62 See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953) (noting that hearing examiners were “mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations”).
63 See Lubbers, supra note 58, at 111.
64 See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 131.
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Congress finally drew the line in 1946 when it enacted the APA. 65 The
APA compromised between these competing concerns. 66 Congress ensured
that agencies kept their ability to make policy by giving the agency the authority to substitute its decision for the examiner’s decision. 67 Congress also
provided for the independence of examiners by removing agency power over
their hiring, 68 case assignment, 69 compensation, 70 discipline, 71 supervision, 72
and, most importantly for the purposes of this Article, their removal. 73
As for removal, Congress prohibited at-will removal. 74 Although Congress did not give examiners life tenure, as is granted to Article III judges,
Congress provided that examiners could be removed only for good cause or
due to a reduction in workforce. 75 If an agency wanted to terminate one of its
65

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2012).
See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996). The removal protections for ALJs were
a central part of the overall scheme of the APA. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2060 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 130; Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950)).
67 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). See Verkuil et al., supra note 56, at 803.
68 Congress vested the appointment of ALJs in each agency. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012). While Congress gave agencies the power to appoint examiners, Congress also gave the Civil Service Commission
the power to determine who was qualified to be hired. Lubbers, supra note 58, at 111. The Commission
reorganized in 1978. Our Mission, Role & History, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/
about-us/our-mission-role-history (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). The Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”) took over responsibility for civil service personnel management. Id. Pursuant to this system,
agencies selected their examiners from a list of qualified applicants that OPM provided when an opening
occurred. Consequently, although examiners usually worked for one agency, they only became eligible to
be hired through a process OPM oversaw. This two-step process provided some independence for the
examiners. See Lubbers, supra note 58, at 111–12. However, on July 10, 2018, President Trump eliminated OPM from the hiring process. See Executive Order 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755, 32,755–56 (July
13, 2018).
69 5 U.S.C. § 3105.
70 Congress provided that ALJ compensation was to be determined based on tenure rather than performance. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012) (noting that ALJs are not employees and thus not subject to the
employee performance appraisal systems mandated under 5 U.S.C. § 4302 (2012)); 5 U.S.C. § 5372
(2012).
71 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (permitting an agency to take disciplinary action against an administrative
law judge “only for good cause”).
72 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
73 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (providing that “[a]n action may be taken against an administrative law judge
appointed under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed
only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . ”). Note that
the Merit Systems Protection Board “for the purpose of section 7521 . . . may investigate, prescribe regulations, appoint advisory committees as necessary, recommend legislation, subpena [sic] witnesses and
records, and pay witness fees as established for the courts of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012).
74 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
75 5 U.S.C. § 7521; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.137 (2018). In addition, the APA required that ALJs be assigned
cases on a rotating basis and that ALJs not perform duties inconsistent with their role as ALJs. 5 U.S.C. §
3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.212 (2007). Finally, Congress provided that examiners could “not be
66
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examiners, the agency would make that recommendation to another agency,
the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). By way of a formal adjudication in front of an MSPB ALJ, the MSPB would determine whether good
cause existed, not the employing agency. 76 Importantly, both the MSPB ALJ
and the members of the MSPB are protected from at-will removal as well. 77
B.

The Multi-Track For-Cause Removal Provisions Protecting ALJs

ALJs are protected from more than one level of at-will removal. If an
agency wishes to discipline or fire one of its ALJs, it must file a petition with
the MSPB. 78 During the ensuing formal adjudication, the firing agency must
persuade an ALJ from the MSPB that the firing agency has good cause for
the ALJ’s removal. 79 Convincing an MSPB ALJ to uphold a firing agency’s
decision to remove a fellow ALJ can be difficult. 80 Then, if the MSPB agrees
with its ALJ’s decision not to remove the firing agency’s ALJ, the firing
agency can do nothing further, and the President can do nothing further. 81
Everyone involved, even the members of the MSPB, 82 are protected from atwill removal. Hence, ALJs are protected from removal from multiple forcause limitations: their own, the MSPB ALJ’s, and the MSPB head’s.
Additionally, most, if not all, Independent ALJs—those who work for
the independent agencies—work for agency heads also protected from at-will
removal. 83 Hence, Independent ALJs fall under an additional level of removal
protection: their agency heads’ protection. The following figure provides a
visual of the multi-track for-cause removal provisions discussed in this Part:

responsible to, or subject to supervision by, anyone performing investigative or prosecutorial functions
for an agency.” Lubbers, supra note 58, at 111; 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012). Congress also required
agencies to separate their prosecuting functions from their adjudicating functions. Thus, any agency employee who investigated or prosecuted a case could not supervise or direct the work of those individuals
who adjudicated the same case. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012). Additionally, those individuals who investigated or prosecuted a case could not be part of the decision-making process, subject to a few exceptions.
Id. (“This subsection does not apply . . . to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising
the agency.”). Lastly, Congress restricted some ex parte communications. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2012).
76 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
77 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012) (providing that the president may remove them “only for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
78 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
79 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
80 See, e.g., Long v. SSA, 635 F.3d 526, 528, 530–31 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the MSPB’s decision to reverse an ALJ’s finding in favor of another ALJ).
81 5 U.S.C. §§ 1202(d), 7521.
82 5 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 7521.
83 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–29 (1935).
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[Figure 1]
ALJ
Removal Limitations
Removal
Limitation
Level A1

Executive ALJs
For-Cause Removal

Agency Heads
At-Will Removal

Removal
Limitation
Level B1

Removal
Limitation
Level B2

Independent ALJs
For-Cause Removal

Removal
Limitation
Level A2

Agency Heads
For-Cause Removal

MSPB ALJ
For-Cause Removal

MSPB Heads
For-Cause Removal

Removal
Limitation
Level A1

Removal
Limitation
Level B1

Removal
Limitation
Level B2

As this figure demonstrates, all ALJs have potentially three levels of
for-cause removal protection: their own, the MSPB ALJ’s protection, and the
members of the MSPB’s protection. However, Independent ALJs have an
additional layer of protection: their agency heads’ for-cause removal protection. As you can see, these removal provisions are not in a straight line; rather, there are two different tracks. Hence, this Article refers to these protections as “multi-track.” The Independent ALJs, thus, have two tracks of dual
for-cause removal protection. Essentially, this means they are not going anywhere, absent falling-down-drunk incompetence.
II.

LOCATING THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL POWER

The Constitution vests in the President the power to execute the laws.84
To execute the laws, the President must have help from subordinates. 85 In the
84

U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Free Enterprise
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010)), vacated, reh’g granted en banc,
85
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First Congress, James Madison stated that “if any power whatsoever is in its
nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling
those who execute the laws.” 86 For this reason, the Constitution explicitly
provides for the appointment of principal and inferior officers and the creation of executive departments. 87
Concurrently, the Constitution requires the President to take care that
the laws are faithfully executed. 88 To take care that the laws are faithfully
executed, the President must have the ability to oversee and supervise the
officers and departments helping him perform his duties. 89 To oversee and
supervise these executive officers, the President must be able to remove officers who ignore his direction; otherwise, a subordinate could ignore the
President's direction, and the President could do nothing about it. 90
Yet, unlike for appointments, the Constitution does not explicitly identify how officers are to be removed, other than the cumbersome impeachment
process. 91 As Justice Breyer has stated, “with the exception of the general
‘vesting’ and ‘take care’ language, the Constitution is completely ‘silent with
respect to the power of removal from office.’” 92 Hence, members of the First
Congress—many of whom had taken part in the Constitution’s drafting 93—
had to determine whether the President could remove executive officers.94
Congress concluded “that the executive power included a power to oversee
executive officers through removal; because that traditional executive power

2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), reinstated, reh’g granted in part, 881 F.3d 75
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
86 Id. at 13 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 463 (Madison) (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
87 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
88 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
89 PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 12–13 (citing Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 498–502).
90 Id.; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (“Once an officer is appointed, it is only the
authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the
performance of his functions, obey.”) (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (1986));
see generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
91 See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 492 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), 16 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 893 (2004)) (“The view
that ‘prevailed’ . . . was that the executive power included a power to oversee executive officers through
removal; because that traditional executive power was not ‘expressly taken away, it remained with the
President.’”). The Constitution contains only one removal provision. That provision states that “all civil
Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. The impeachment process
is seldom used. WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 60 (5th ed. 2016)
(“[T]he only method of removal prescribed in the Constitution is impeachment. Since the grounds for
impeachment are limited and the impeachment process is cumbersome, officers are seldom impeached.”).
92 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 516 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839)).
93 Id. at 492 (majority opinion) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986)).
94 Id.
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was not ‘expressly taken away, it remained with the President.’” 95 The understanding that a President’s removal power comes along with his power to
oversee executive officers is well settled today: 96
The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the laws
also gives him the power to do so. That power includes, as a general matter, the authority to
remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties. Without such power, the President
could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would
stop somewhere else. 97

However, as Part III of this Article explains, the removal power is not
absolute. 98 The Supreme Court has held that Congress may sometimes limit
the President’s power to remove an officer to ensure that officer’s independence. 99 The Executive’s desire for unfettered removal power clashes with the
legislature’s desire to limit that power in such situations, like the one here.
Congress has limited the President’s ability to remove ALJs by providing for
multiple levels of for-cause removal protection. The question then becomes
whether Congress can do so without violating the Constitution.
III. PROTECTING & CABINING THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL POWER
The Constitution does not explicitly define the Executive’s power to remove officers. However, Congress has explored ways to limit the President’s
removal power. Part III of this Article identifies some of these cases and explains how the Court has interpreted and defined the President’s ability to
remove officers within the constraints of the Constitution.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Three-Phase Approach to Removal

Likely because the Constitution does not explicitly define the Executive’s power to remove officers, the Supreme Court has provided conflicting

95 Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), 16 Documentary
History of the First Federal Congress 893 (2004)).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 513–14.
98 See discussion infra Part III.
99 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619, 625, 628–29 (1935) (The Court
upheld a removal provision limiting the president’s ability to remove a commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” in part because the
FTC was designed to be independent and free from domination and control of the president.); Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (The Court notes that “the congressional determination to limit the
removal power of the Attorney General was essential . . . to establish the necessary independence of the
office.”).
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direction in the cases addressing this issue since Marbury v. Madison. 100
However, this Article groups these cases into three phases. Phase one: protecting the President’s removal power from Congressional intrusion and limitation; phase two: limiting the President’s removal power to protect officer
independence; and phase three: limiting removal restrictions that impede the
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties.
1.

Phase One: Protecting the President’s Removal Power

The Supreme Court 101 first addressed the validity of executive removal
in 1839 in Ex parte Hennen. 102 In Hennen, an inferior officer sought mandamus after he was removed from his position as a district court clerk. 103 The
Court rejected the clerk’s argument that his removal was unconstitutional under Article II. 104 The relevant statute contained no removal limitation, and the
Court refused to imply one. 105 Silence, the Court held, meant that the executive retained full removal power. 106 The Court reasoned that when Congress
fails to provide for removal of inferior officers, (1) Congress likely does not
intend those officers to hold their term for life; 107 (2) the power of removal is
incidental to the power of appointment; 108 and (3) because “[t]he appointment
of clerks of Courts properly belongs to the Courts of law,” the courts would
also have removal power. 109

100 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). “[A]s the law creating the office [of the justice of the peace], gave
the officer a right to hold it for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of this country.” Id. at 162. The
Court subsequently rejected this statement as obiter dictum in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 141–
42 (1926).
101 While state supreme courts had addressed this issue (see, e.g., Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham,
3 Mass. 160 (1807)), this case is the first where the U.S. Supreme Court discussed executive removal
power.
102 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
103 Id. at 256.
104 Id. at 261–62.
105 See id. at 258−59 (reasoning that while the first section of the Act of May 18, 1820, 3 Story, 1790
did limit the tenure of certain officers to a four-year term, “clerks of Courts are not included within this
law, and there is no express limitation in the Constitution, or laws of Congress, upon the tenure of the
[clerks’] office.” Thus, because the tenure for the office of clerks is not fixed, these officers are “removable at pleasure.”).
106 See id. at 258–60 (maintaining that because “[t]the Constitution is silent with respect to the power
of removal from office, where the tenure is not fixed,” the tenure of the clerks’ office “must be held at the
will and discretion of some department of the government, and subject to removal at pleasure.” Also,
“although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their
office at the will and discretion of the head of the department.”).
107 Id. at 259.
108 Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259.
109 Id. at 258.
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Similarly, in Parsons v. United States, 110 the Court again refused to imply a removal limitation in a statute that did not expressly contain one. 111 The
Court held that Congress had not intended to limit the President’s power to
remove an inferior officer, in this instance a district attorney. 112 The relevant
act provided that “[d]istrict attorneys shall be appointed for a term of four
years” and did not contain any provision addressing removal. 113 Like it had
in Hennen, the Court refused to imply a removal limitation.114
With these two cases, the Court held that removal limitations will not
be implied. Rather, Congress must provide a clear statement in the statute
when it wants to limit the President’s power to remove an officer. In contrast,
in United States v. Perkins, 115 the Court reviewed an act in which Congress
had included a removal limitation. 116 In Perkins, a naval cadet, an inferior
officer, was honorably discharged because his services were no longer required during peacetime. 117 He sued for lost salary. 118 The relevant act barred
his peacetime discharge except “for misconduct.” 119
The issue for the Court was whether Congress could limit the Executive’s removal authority when appointment was vested in the head of a department, rather than in the President directly. 120 The Court held that Congress could limit removal under these circumstances. 121 According to the
Court, when Congress “vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads
of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems
best for the public interest.” 122 In other words, Congress’s power to vest appointments in an entity other than the Executive provided Congress with the
concomitant power to limit removal of that inferior officer.123 Notably, the
President retained removal power over the head of the department (the Secretary of the Navy): the principal officer. 124
Hence, Congress could limit the ability of a department to remove an
inferior officer it appointed. So far, the Court had only examined the issue of
110

167 U.S. 324 (1897).
Id. at 338–39.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 327–28.
114 Id. at 343.
115 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
116 Id. at 483–84 (citing Rev. Stat. §§ 1229, 1525).
117 Id. at 483.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 483–85 (citing Rev. Stat. §§ 1229, 1525).
120 See id. at 484 (“Whether or not Congress can restrict the power of removal incident to the power
of appointment of those officers who are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate under the authority of the Constitution (article 2, section 2) does not arise in this case and
need not be considered.”).
121 Perkins, 116 U.S. at 485.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
111
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removal in the case of inferior officers; the Court had yet 125 to address the
legitimacy of removal limitations regarding principal officers. But that was
about to change.
In 1926, in Myers v. United States, 126 the Court held that the President
has unfettered power under the Constitution to remove officers he appointed
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 127 The plaintiff, Myers, was appointed to be a postmaster in Portland, Oregon, for a four-year term. 128 Before
the term’s conclusion, President Woodrow Wilson removed him. 129 Myers
sued to recover his salary from the date of his removal. 130
The relevant act provided, “Postmasters of the first, second and third
classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate and shall hold their offices for four years
unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.” 131 The Senate had
not consented to Myers’s removal. 132 The issue for the Court was whether the
removal limitation (requiring the advice and consent of the Senate) was constitutional. 133 Importantly, Chief Justice Taft, a former president himself,
wrote the opinion, which was extremely protective of the President’s power
to remove those who worked for him or her. The Court held that the removal
limitation was unconstitutional.134 Congress cannot limit the Executive’s
power to remove officers he appoints, namely principal officers. 135
The Court examined in excruciating detail 136 the views of the First Congress regarding the nature of the executive power and the importance of the
Take Care Clause. 137 The Court then concluded that because the President
must have “confidence in the intelligence, ability, judgment or loyalty of [his
executive subordinate], he must have the power to remove him without delay.” 138 To require the President to file for-cause charges and submit those

125 In United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 302–03 (1855), the issue of
whether the president had the power to remove a territorial judge was argued but not decided.
126 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
127 Id. at 163–64, 172.
128 Id. at 106.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 107 (quoting Act of Congress of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. 80, 81, c. 179).
132 Myers, 272 U.S. at 107.
133 Id. at 106–08.
134 Id. at 176.
135 Id. at 163–64.
136 Id. at 109–35. See also Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 328–31 (1897) (describing the
same history in fewer pages).
137 Myers, 272 U.S. at 108. The Court also cited the Commander in Chief Clause, the Appointments
Clause, the Impeachment Clause, and the Faithfully Execute Clause. Id. at 108–09 (citing U.S. CONST.
art. II, §§ 2, 3, & 4).
138 Id. at 134.
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charges to the Senate “might make impossible that unity and co-ordination
in executive administration essential to effective action.” 139
Because the Court had upheld a removal limitation in Perkins, the Court
had to reconcile that case with the one before it. The Court reasoned that
Myers was consistent with Perkins because the provision in Perkins limited
a department’s ability to remove an officer, not the President’s ability to do
so. 140
The Court also noted that in the provision at issue in Myers, Congress
had retained removal power for itself and, thus, had aggrandized its own
power at the expense of the Executive. 141 In contrast, in the removal provision
at issue in Perkins, Congress had not aggrandized itself. 142 Further, the Myers
Court suggested that the removal limitation at issue in Perkins was merely
incidental. 143 The Court reasoned that incidental restrictions on the Executive
were legitimate so long as Congress did not keep removal power for itself. 144
The Court underscored that it had never allowed Congress
to draw to itself . . . the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of [the
removal] power. To do this would be to go beyond the words and implications of that clause
and to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers. 145

One difference the Myers Court did not focus on, but perhaps should
have, was that the officer in Perkins was an inferior officer and the officer in
Myers was a principal officer. Resting the different holdings on this distinction would have made some sense; principal officers work more closely and
directly with their appointing presidents, so the president might expect more
loyalty from them and control over them. 146 Indeed, more than ninety years
139

Id.
According to the Court in Myers, whether an officer is principal or inferior should have no bearing
on whether the limitation on the president’s removal power is constitutional; rather, the focus should turn
to who holds this power in compliance with the Constitution. So, even though the Court may have incorrectly held that the postmaster in that case was a principal officer, when in all likelihood he was inferior,
this difference did not matter to the Court. See id. at 161.
141 Id. at 162, 168.
142 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 162.
143 Id. at 161.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1205, 1228 (2014) (“The person that controls removal commands the subordinate’s loyalty—a simple
truth of administration that an officer will seek to please the person that decides whether the officer stays
or goes.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 667 (1996) (“A
better reading of the ‘principal Officer’ language is that it exemplifies the Founders’ expectation that the
President will ordinarily directly pick, act through, and monitor only a handful of personal lieutenants—
his inner circle. As Hamilton observed in The Federalist No. 72, department heads ‘ought to be considered
as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, and on this account they ought to derive their offices
from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence.’”).
140
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later, Chief Justice Roberts suggested in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board 147 that the nature of the officer’s status was determinative in these early removal cases. 148 It was not, but it should
have been.
At the end of these Phase One cases, the Court had held that removal
limitations would not be implied. Further, Congress could limit a department’s ability to remove an inferior officer it appointed so long as the limitation was merely “incidental,” whatever that means. In contrast, removal
restrictions on the President would not be allowed, especially if Congress
retained a role in the removal for itself.
What did not matter at this point in the Court’s approach was the type
of power the officer exercised: executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-adjudicatory. In Myers, the officer exercised executive powers; however, the
Court suggested in dicta that its holding would likely extend to officers exercising quasi-adjudicatory powers as well. 149 The President’s unfettered removal power flowed from his “constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be
faithfully executed.” 150 Hence, presidents must retain the power to remove
those who work for them, regardless of the type of power they exercised.151
However, this dicta would give way in Phase Two.
2.

Phase Two: Cabining the President’s Removal Power to Further
Independence

Ten years after Myers, the Court reversed course in Humphrey’s Executor. The relevant act in Humphrey’s Executor established the Federal Trade
147

561 U.S. 477 (2010).
Id. at 510 (holding that because “the Board members are inferior officers,” the Commission has
the power to remove Board members at will).
149 Myers, 272 U.S. at 135.
Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a
particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there may be duties of
a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of executive tribunals
whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly influence or control. But even in such a case he may
consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the ground that
the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.
Id.
150 Id.
151 The Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause gave the dissent pause. As if foreshadowing the
current controversy regarding the SEC ALJs, Justice Holmes warned that drawing arguments “from the
executive power of the President, and from his duty to appoint officers of the United States (when Congress does not vest the appointment elsewhere), to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to
commission all officers of the United States, seem to [be] spider’s webs inadequate to control the dominant
facts.” Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
148
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Commission (“FTC”), an independent agency, and contained a for-cause removal provision protecting the FTC Commissioners. 152 Pursuant to this forcause removal provision, the President could remove an FTC Commissioner 153 only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 154
Unlike the act at issue in Myers, in this act, Congress did not retain removal
power for itself. 155
The Court upheld the for-cause removal limitation, which should have
been unconstitutional pursuant to its holding in Myers. 156 The Court distinguished Myers in three ways. 157 The most critical difference between the two
cases was the type of power the officers exercised. 158 The postmaster in Myers performed purely executive functions and had no quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial power. 159 Because he performed purely executive functions,
the Court reasoned that the officer had to be responsive to the President. 160
In contrast, the FTC Commissioners performed both quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers, 161 which required that they be independent from
the President. 162 Because of the different nature of the job duties, the Court
said that Myers did not apply to “an officer who occupies no place in the
executive department and who exercises no part of the executive power
vested by the Constitution in the President.” 163 The Court acknowledged that
Myers had said removal limitations on quasi-judicial officers were unconstitutional as well; 164 however, the Court rejected its statement as non-controlling dicta. 165

152

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
Id. Because the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 42, required that all Commissioners be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Court assumed that
FTC Commissioners were principal officers. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619–20
(1935). Like it had in Myers, however, the Court did not mention the distinction between principal and
inferior officers.
154 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
155 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
156 Id. at 632.
157 Id. at 627.
158 Id. at 631–32.
159 Id. at 627.
160 Id. at 631–32.
161 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628.
162 Id. at 627–28 (“A postmaster is an executive officer restricted to the performance of executive
functions. He is charged with no duty at all related to either the legislative or judicial power. The actual
decision in the Myers case finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely one of the units in the
executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by
the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is . . . [The Commission’s] duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control.”).
163 Id. at 628.
164 Id. at 631–32.
165 Id. at 627–28.
153
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In addition to the difference in the officers’ powers, the Court raised two
other important distinctions. First, the Court noted that Congress had intended the FTC and its Commissioners to be independent from the President,
unlike the post office and postmasters. 166 Allowing the President unfettered
removal would hinder independence. Second, unlike postmasters, FTC Commissioners’ tenure was time-limited. 167 Thus, removal was already built into
the system. The Court reasoned that both factors further supported the legitimacy of the removal limitations.168
As a result of Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, the Court had created
the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction 169: Congress could not limit the President’s power to remove purely executive officers; however, Congress could
limit the President’s power to remove quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officers, especially when such officers’ tenure was already time-limited. 170 The
Court’s strong protection of the President’s removal power weakened with
the advent of this distinction, but it was about to weaken even more significantly.
The Myers–Humphrey’s distinction held firm for half a century. Thus,
in 1958, the Court applied the distinction in Wiener v. United States 171 to hold
that Congress could limit the President’s power to remove a member of the
War Claims Commission. 172 The plaintiff, Wiener, had refused to resign
when asked to do so by President Eisenhower. 173 Wiener filed suit to recover
his unpaid salary. 174 The relevant act did not have an explicit removal provision but effectively provided that the Commissioners served three-year
terms. 175 The issue for the Court was whether the act contained an implied
for-cause removal provision. 176 Recall that the Court had refused to imply
for-cause removal limitations in Hennen and Parsons. 177 While Hennen and
Parsons involved inferior officers, their protective holdings could easily apply to a principal officer under Myers. The Court should have held that it

166

Id. at 628–30.
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S.at 620 (setting a seven-year term). See also Shurtleff v. United States,
189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903) (holding that while an inferior officer had limited tenure, Congress had not
explicitly intended to limit the president’s general removal power). Note that the limited tenure of the
officer had also played no role in the Court’s decision in Hennen, Parsons, and Myers.
168 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626, 628.
169 Jellum & Tincher, supra note 5, at 44.
170 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631–32; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926).
171 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
172 Id. at 356.
173 Id. at 350.
174 Id. at 350–51.
175 The commission itself was limited to a three-year life, meaning the Commissioners’ terms were
also restricted to three years. Id. at 350.
176 Id. at 351, 356.
177 See supra notes 105, 114.
167
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would not imply a removal provision without a clear statement from Congress. But, the Court did not.
Instead, the Court upheld the removal provision, citing Myers and
Humphrey’s Executor. 178 First, the Court reasoned that Congress was aware
that the holding in Humphrey’s Executor rested on the Myers–Humphrey’s
distinction when it enacted the War Claims Act of 1948. 179 Second, the Court
decided that because War Claims Commissioners exercised quasi-adjudicatory powers, Congress would have intended them to be “‘entirely free from
the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,’ of either the Executive
or the Congress.” 180 Third, the Court noted that Humphrey’s Executor prevented Congress from limiting the President’s ability to remove purely executive officers, not quasi-adjudicatory officers. 181 Thus, the Court concluded
that Congress had simply forgotten to address removal. 182 This “failure of
explicitness” was not fatal, given the powers of the Commissioners. 183 The
Court held that the President had no power to remove these officers, who
were “member[s] of an adjudicatory body.” 184
The holding in Wiener is odd for several reasons. First, the Court failed
to distinguish, let alone mention, Hennen or Parsons, in which the Court had
required Congress to be explicit when it wanted removal limitations. 185 Second, the Court implied a removal limitation based solely on Congress’s likely
awareness of its holding in Humphrey’s Executor, even though Congress provided no removal provision in the act itself.186 Finally, the Court relied entirely on the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction to uphold the removal provision
because this distinction furthered officer independence. 187 With Wiener, the
Court itself, not Congress, limited the President’s removal power. This holding simply cannot be correct.
The Wiener Court had used the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction to insert
itself into crafting removal limitations. In contrast, in 1986 in Bowsher v.
Synar, 188 the Court used the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction to strike down an
express removal provision. 189 In Wiener, Congress had not provided a removal limitation; yet, the Court implied one anyway. In Bowsher, Congress
provided an express removal provision, but it aggrandized its own power. 190

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Wiener, 357 U.S. at 351–52.
Id. at 353, 356.
Id. at 355–56 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
Id. at 352.
See id. at 352–53.
Id.
Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356.
See supra notes 105, 114.
Wiener, 357 U.S. at 352–53.
Id. at 356.
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Id. at 724–25.
Id. at 720–21, 728–29.
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So, the Court rejected it. 191 And in both cases, the Court entirely ignored Hennen, Parsons, and Perkins.
The relevant act in Bowsher 192 provided that the officer, the comptroller
general, could be removed for cause 193 by a joint resolution of Congress,
which was subject to presidential veto. 194 The Act’s legislative history clearly
indicated that Congress included the removal provision specifically so that
“[i]f [the comptroller general] does not do his work properly, [Congress], as
practically his employers, ought to be able to discharge him from his office.” 195
Like it had in the unconstitutional removal provision at issue in Myers,
Congress inserted itself into the removal process. Not surprisingly then, the
Court struck down the provision in Bowsher as unconstitutional. 196 The Court
reasoned that the comptroller general’s functions were the “very essence” of
executing the law; 197 hence, Congress could not limit the President’s removal
power. 198 Additionally, the Court lamented that Congress had once again aggrandized its own power at the expense of the Executive. 199
In Bowsher, as in Myers, the Court held that Congress did not have authority to retain for itself any power over the removal of an officer. 200 Further,
because the officer exercised purely executive powers, removal power belonged exclusively to the President. 201 While more protective of the President’s removal powers than Humphrey’s Executor, Bowsher actually added
little to the analysis: the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction was determinative,
and Congress could not constitutionally reserve removal power for itself.
Critically, up to this point of Phase Two, the Court had said nothing
about whether its new approach to removal limitations differed based on the
type of officer involved: principal or inferior. That issue was the next one the
Court would address. And, in doing so, the Court would issue one of its most
poorly reasoned opinions of all time.

191

Id. at 726.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act is also known as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
(2012)).
193 Congress had limited the for-cause removal to cases involving permanent disability, inefficiency,
neglect of duty, malfeasance, committing a felony, or committing other conduct involving moral turpitude. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 728 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B)).
194 Id. at 718–19.
195 Id. at 728 (quoting Representative Hawley, 58 Cong. Rec. 7136 (1919)).
196 Id. at 733–34.
197 Id. at 733.
198 Id. at 733–34.
199 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727.
200 Id. at 726–27.
201 Id. at 733.
192
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Two years after Bowsher, in Morrison v. Olson, 202 the Court explicitly
rejected the determinacy of the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction. 203 The act at
issue in Morrison 204 established a “purely executive” inferior officer 205 “to
investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government
officials” involved in criminal activity. 206 The act provided that only the Attorney General could remove an independent counsel and only “for good
cause.” 207 The independent counsel performed “core executive functions,” 208
so the removal provision should have been unconstitutional under the Myers–
Humphrey’s distinction. 209
However, the Court had held in Perkins that when Congress vests appointment of an officer in a department, Congress can then limit that department’s ability to remove the officer. 210 The Morrison Court needed only to
cite to Perkins to hold the removal limitation constitutional. The Court chose
another route. Relegating Perkins to a “see also” footnote, 211 the Court instead attempted, but failed, to reconcile Bowsher, Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener. 212
First, the Court noted that Humphrey’s Executor had made clear that the
Constitution did not give the President “‘illimitable power of removal’” over
all executive officers.213 Second, the Court stressed that “[u]nlike both

202

487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 689–91.
204 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was the relevant act at issue in Morrison. Pub. L. 95−521,
92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2012)); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659
(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. V)).
205 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689.
206 Id. at 660.
207 Id. at 663.
208 Id. at 669.
209 What about the current Special Counsel? Former Special Counsel Robert Mueller was an inferior
officer. He worked for the Attorney General, a principal officer. So, Congress could have constitutionally
prohibited his at-will removal. Congress did not do so. However, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
which created the position, did. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d). To remove Mueller, the President would have had
to direct Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein to fire Mueller, claiming either that there was cause or
that the DOJ’s removal restriction violated his removal power. While the President could have directed
the DOJ to revoke its special counsel regulations and then fire Muller directly, that choice was unlikely
because it would have required the DOJ to conduct a time-consuming rulemaking.
Under the Supreme Court’s removal cases, this provision likely does violate the president’s removal power. Removal provisions for inferior officers are not implied; they must be explicit. In this case,
Congress did not enact a removal limitation; likely, Congress had learned a hard lesson from the Independent Counsel experience at issue in Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). In fact, Congress did not create
the Office of Special Counsel. The DOJ did. 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.4-600.10. Legally then, President Trump
could have directed Rosenstein to fire Mueller or even fire Mueller directly. Politically, firing Mueller
would have been significantly more difficult. Perhaps that is why Mueller was never fired.
210 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
211 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n.27.
212 Id. at 686.
213 Id. at 687 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
203
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Bowsher and Myers, [Morrison did] not involve an attempt by Congress itself
to gain a role in the removal of executive officials other than its established
powers of impeachment and conviction.” 214 In other words, no congressional
aggrandizement existed.
Third, the majority acknowledged that it had “undoubtedly” relied “on
the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial’ to distinguish the officials
involved in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener from those in Myers.” 215 However, the Court explained, its new “considered view” was that the Myers–
Humphrey’s distinction was not determinative 216 because “the determination
of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a ‘good cause’–type
restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to
turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’” 217 The
Court did not explain why the distinction was no longer relevant.
The Court did explain that while the type of functions an officer performs could be relevant to the analysis, 218 the more important question was
whether the constraint on presidential removal “unduly trammel[ed] on executive authority.” 219 A removal restriction unduly trammels on executive authority when it interferes with a president’s ability to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. 220 In a never-before-seen approach, the Court merged the
President’s removal power with the take care obligation.
The majority crafted a functional balancing test to determine whether
the President’s ability to faithfully execute the law was actually unduly impeded such that the removal limitation would be unconstitutional. 221 The test
had two prongs. Pursuant to the first prong, the Court examined whether the
President’s need to control the officer was “so central to the functioning of
the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the
counsel be terminable at will by the President.” 222 The Court reasoned that
the independent counsel in Morrison was an inferior officer who had limited
jurisdiction and tenure and who lacked policymaking and significant
214

Id. at 686.
Id. at 689.
216 Id.
217 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689.
218 Id. at 691.
219 Id.
220 The Court said:
[O]ur present considered view is that the determination of whether the Constitution allows
Congress to impose a “good cause”-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as “purely executive.” The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of
those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that
Congress does not interfere with the President’s exercise of the “executive power” and his
constitutionally appointed duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article
II.
Id. at 689–90.
221 Id. at 690–93.
222 Id. at 691–92 (emphasis added).
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administrative authority. 223 Thus, the Court concluded that the independent
counsel was not “so central.” 224
Pursuant to the second prong, the Court examined whether the good
cause removal provision “sufficiently deprive[d] the President of control over
the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional
obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.” 225 The Court in Morrison noted that the President retained the ability to remove the Attorney
General without cause, and the Attorney General had the ability to remove
the independent counsel for “misconduct.” 226 Importantly, the majority noted
that Congress believed the removal limitation was essential to ensuring the
independence of the office. 227 Here, congressional desire for independence
trumped the President’s power to remove a purely executive officer. Thus,
the Court concluded that the President was not “sufficiently deprive[d]” of
control. 228
In short, the Court held that some limits on the President’s removal powers will be tolerated (the so central prong), so long as the President is mostly
able to ensure the laws are faithfully executed (the sufficiently deprives
prong). Hence, the good cause limitation at issue in Morrison did not impermissibly interfere with the President’s obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. 229 Regardless of whether the Court’s holding was correct,
its reasoning was result-oriented, which the dissent rightfully points out.
Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. 230 He began his opinion by reminding the majority of the importance of separation of powers. 231 He then explained the political kerfuffle that led to the relevant act––a kerfuffle between
President Reagan and Congress. 232 He argued that the act was unconstitutional because (1) the officer involved was a principal officer; (2) criminal
prosecution was a “purely executive power”; and (3) the act deprived the
President of the ability to exercise “exclusive control” of that executive
power. 233 Rejecting the majority’s new “so central–sufficiently deprives”
two-pronged test, Scalia said simply, “It is not for us to determine . . . how
much of the purely executive powers of government must be within the full
control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are.” 234 He

223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
Id. at 691–92.
Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692.
Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 699.
Id. at 699–703.
Id. at 705, 716.
Id. at 709.
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concluded that the statute deprived the President of substantial control over
purely executive powers and impermissibly affected the balance of powers
among the branches. 235
Was Justice Scalia correct that the independent counsel was a principal
officer, 236 or was the majority correct that the independent counsel was an
inferior officer? 237 In a latter case, Justice Scalia defined an inferior officer as
one who has a supervisor who is directly accountable to the President. 238 Using this test, the independent counsel in Morrison was an inferior officer because that officer had a supervisor, the Attorney General, who was directly
accountable to the President. 239 So, the majority seems to have gotten this
point correct.
Morrison’s majority holding and undefined balancing test have been
rightly criticized for departing from precedent and separation of powers principles. 240 In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent better respected both. Indeed,
former Attorney General Janet Reno paraphrased Scalia’s dissent when criticizing the act to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 241 And Justice Kagan has called Scalia’s dissent “one of the greatest dissents ever written and every year it gets better.” 242
With Morrison, a majority of the Court rejected the dispositive effect of
the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction. In its place, the majority emphasized the
importance of determining whether removal provisions actually impede the
President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws. Removal provisions actually
impede the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws when the President's need to control an officer’s exercise of discretion is “so central” to the
functioning of the executive branch and when the President’s ability to control that officer is “sufficiently deprived.” Blame the majority for this awkward mishmash; then rejoice in knowing that Morrison’s mishmash was
short-lived.

235

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 714–15.
Id. at 717–18.
237 Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
238 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
239 See id. at 666.
240 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Counsels with Congressional Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1599 n.14 (2000) (citing numerous newspaper articles criticizing the
Independent Counsel Act).
241 Terry Eastland, Scalia’s Finest Opinion, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (March 11, 2016, 12:40 AM),
https://www.weeklystandard.com/terry-eastland/scalias-finest-opinion. Apparently, Justice Scalia considered his dissent in Morrison to be his best opinion as well. Id.
242 Terry Nagel, Supreme Court Justice and Circuit Judges Give SLS Students Insider’s Look at
Becoming a Judge, THE STANFORD LAWYER (February 5, 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/press/supremecourt-justice-and-circuit-judges-give-sls-students-insider-look-at-becoming-a-judge/.
236
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Phase Three: Rejecting Removal Restrictions That Impede the
President’s Ability to Faithfully Execute the Law

The officer in Morrison was subject to only one level of for-cause removal; thus, the case left open the question of whether more than one level
of for-cause removal limitations would be constitutional.243 In 2010, the Supreme Court answered this question with a resounding “No!”
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court examined the validity of the forcause removal provision Congress wrote into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. 244 In this legislation, Congress created a private, non-profit corporation: 245 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“Board”). 246 Unusually, Congress vested the power to appoint and remove the five Board
members in the SEC. 247 However, the SEC Commissioners could remove individual members of the Board “only ‘for good cause shown.’” 248 Thus, Congress placed appointment power of these inferior officers in a department and
limited the department’s ability to remove them at will.249
Under Perkins and Morrison, removal limitations on departments that
appoint inferior officers are constitutional. 250 Case closed, right? Nope. There
was a further wrinkle. Unlike the Secretary of the Navy in Perkins and the
Attorney General in Morrison, the SEC Commissioners were themselves removable only for cause. 251 Or, at least, the parties in Free Enterprise Fund
stipulated to this effect and the Court, without considering the issue at all,
simply accepted the parties’ stipulation. 252 This was a significant concession
and likely an inaccurate one. 253
243

Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495 (2010).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (or Act), Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–02, 7211 et seq. (2012)).
245 According to the statute, Board members are not Government “officer[s] or employee[s].” Free
Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (b) (2012)). Although the Board members
were not Government officials for statutory purposes, the Court considered the board “‘part of the Government’ for constitutional purposes . . .” Id. at 485–86 (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995)).
246 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.
247 Id. at 484, 486. Also, the SEC oversees the Board. Id. at 486 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6),
7217(b)–(c) (2012)). The Board members have staggered, five-year terms. Id. at 484.
248 Id. at 486 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2012)).
249 Id. at 486.
250 See supra notes 210, 223, 226.
251 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
252 Id. (“The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President
except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”) (citation omitted).
253 This issue was necessary to the Court’s holding; yet, the Court did not actually determine that the
SEC Commissioners were removable only for cause. One wonders why the Court did not apply the constitutional avoidance doctrine, interpret the statute to not include for-cause removal and, thereby, avoid
the removal question. It appears that the majority was set on reviewing the constitutionality of this very
powerful board.
244
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It is very likely that, had the Court actually analyzed this issue, the Court
would have rejected the stipulation. Congress had enacted the act establishing the SEC 254 the year before Humphrey’s Executor reversed Myers. Myers
had held that removal limitations on the President were per se unconstitutional. Thus, Congress likely assumed that any removal limitations on the
President would violate the Constitution; hence, Congress did not include a
removal limitation in the act.255 All this to say that Congress likely did not
intend for there to be a removal limitation. Yet, the Court, upon the parties’
stipulation, implied a removal limitation where none existed, violating Hennen and Perkins. 256 Further, the Court could have avoided the constitutional
issue altogether pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine by concluding that the SEC Commissioners were removable at will. Indeed, Justice
Breyer, in dissent, accurately noted that whether the SEC Commissioners had
removal protection was so essential to the majority’s holding that resolution
of the issue should not have been based on the parties’ stipulation. 257
In any event, the Court presumed that the members of the Board had
dual for-cause removal protection: they could only be removed for cause by
SEC Commissioners, who themselves could only be removed for cause. 258
Pursuant to Perkins and Humphrey’s Executor, each layer of for-cause removal protection should have been constitutional independently. Recall that
the Court’s holding in Perkins allows Congress to restrict an appointing department’s removal power for inferior officers; 259 hence, the removal limitation on the Board members would be constitutional. The Court’s holding in
Humphrey’s Executor allows Congress to restrict the president’s ability to
remove quasi-adjudicatory and quasi-legislative principal officers; 260 therefore, the removal limitation on the SEC Commissioners would likely be constitutional. Thus, the question for the Court in Free Enterprise Fund was
whether by combining the for-cause removal layers, these provisions become
unconstitutional. 261

254 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et
seq. (2012)).
255 See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
256 But see Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the president’s power to
remove a War Claims Commissioner was impliedly limited even though the statute was silent regarding
removal).
257 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 545–46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 486–87 (majority opinion). As the D.C. Circuit Court has noted, “[J]ust because two structural features raise no constitutional concerns independently does not mean Congress may combine them
in a single statute.” Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. DOT, 721 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
259 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
260 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
261 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 483.
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In examining the merits of the constitutionality of dual for-cause removal provisions, the Court framed the issue as whether “the President
[could] be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is in turn
restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior
officer determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United States?”262
The answer, according to the Court was “no.” 263 The Court reasoned that dual
for-cause removal provisions prevented the President from ensuring that the
laws were faithfully executed because the President could not oversee the
officers who worked for him. 264
In finding that dual for-cause removal protections impeded a President’s
ability to faithfully execute the laws, the Court examined its prior holdings.
First, the Court said that Myers had “reaffirmed the principle that Article II
confers on the president ‘the general administrative control of those executing the laws,’” so he “must have some ‘power of removing those for whom
he can not continue to be responsible.’” 265
Second, the Court observed that Humphrey’s Executor had limited Myers by permitting Congress to limit the President’s ability to remove principal officers who acted in “‘quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial’” capacities,
rather than in “‘purely executive’” capacities.266 Here, the Board members
exercised executive power. 267 Thus, the Court returned to the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction it had only recently rejected in Morrison. 268 However, the
Court explained that Humphrey’s Executor addressed principal officers, not
inferior officers, such as the Board members. 269
Third, the Court mentioned that Perkins had held that when Congress
vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it can
limit the department’s removal power.270 Here, appointment was vested in a
department: the SEC.
Fourth, and finally, the Court distinguished Morrison. In Morrison, the
act at issue prevented the Attorney General from removing the independent
counsel at will, but the President had the power to remove the Attorney General at will. 271 Here, the President had no ability to remove the SEC Commissioners, absent cause. So the Court examined whether dual for-cause limitations “stripped” the President of “his ability to execute the laws—by holding
his subordinates accountable for their conduct.” 272 The Court reasoned that
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272

Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 492–93 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 164 (1926)).
Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–29 (1935)).
See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 498.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 494.
See id. at 494–95.
Id. at 496.
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one level of for-cause removal on executive, inferior officers would be constitutional because the President retained the power to remove the principal
officers if they failed to remove an incompetent inferior officer. 273 However,
the added layer of tenure protection was problematic because the President
would be unable to remove either an incompetent inferior officer (e.g., a
member of the Board) or an incompetent principal officer (e.g., an SEC Commissioner) when the principal officer failed to remove the incompetent inferior officer. 274 Thus, the Court concluded that one for-cause removal limitation on purely executive, inferior officers was constitutional under Morrison;
however, more than one violates both Article II and separation of powers. 275
Then, as if foreshadowing the current controversy regarding ALJs, the
Court asked: if two levels of for-cause tenure protection were constitutional,
then “why not a third?” 276 Multiple for-cause removal provisions would create “a Matryoshka doll of tenure protections” for officers who “would be
immune from Presidential oversight, even as they exercised power in the people’s name.” 277 Hence, the Court concluded that more than one for-cause tenure limitation “subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his
efforts.” 278 To remedy the constitutional infirmity, the Court severed “the unconstitutional tenure provisions . . . from the remainder of the statute.” 279
Justice Breyer dissented. He criticized the majority for failing to “create
a bright-line rule” causing “uncertainty about the scope of its holding.” 280 He
worried that a broad application of the holding in Free Enterprise Fund could
dismantle the entire administrative state by putting the job security of “thousands of high-level Government officials . . . and their administrative actions
and decisions constitutionally at risk.” 281 He specifically foreshadowed that
if dual for-cause removal provisions violated the Constitution, then the removal of more than 1,584 ALJs in over twenty-five agencies would be unconstitutional. 282

273

Id. at 495.
The Court seemed particularly troubled because, not only were there two levels of for-cause removal protection, but for one of them, “Congress [had] enacted an unusually high standard that must be
met before Board members [could] be removed.” Id. at 503. “A Board member cannot be removed except
for willful violations of the Act, Board rules, or the securities laws; willful abuse of authority; or unreasonable failure to enforce compliance . . . ” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 503. The Court described
the Board’s for-cause standard as “a sharply circumscribed definition” that requires “rigorous procedures
that must be followed prior to removal.” Id. at 505.
275 Id. at 496–98.
276 Id. at 497.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 498.
279 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 508.
280 Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282 See id. at 542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
274
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In a footnote, the Court responded to Breyer’s prophetic concern by
suggesting that it was unlikely that its holding would apply to ALJs for three
reasons. First, the majority argued that it was not clear whether ALJs were
officers or employees. 283 Lucia eliminated that reason. 284
Second, citing the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction, the majority reasoned that ALJs perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions, so “of course” removal restrictions would be more suspect. 285
The majority’s “of course” reasoning was disingenuous given, first, none of
the Supreme Court cases up to that point had applied the Myers–Humphrey’s
distinction to removal restrictions on inferior officers; second, the Court
downplayed the importance of the distinction in Morrison; and, third, the
Court separated quasi-adjudicative functions from executive and quasi-legislative functions when Humphrey’s Executor had separated executive functions from quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative functions. 286 Moreover,
the assertion was wrong; the members of the Board performed adjudicative
functions, 287 and ALJs have a policymaking function. 288
Third, the majority noted that the Board members’ for-cause removal
provision was significantly more protective than traditional for-cause removal provisions such as the one protecting ALJs. 289 That fact, at least, was
true. While the Court’s footnoted response to Justice Breyer’s concerns about
the impact on ALJs was dicta at best and confusing at worst, this footnote
will likely play a central role when this issue is decided. 290
Finally, and most recently, the Supreme Court carefully dodged the issue of whether the multiple for-cause removal restrictions on SEC ALJs violate the Constitution in Lucia v. SEC, 291 despite the Solicitor General’s repeated attempts to raise the issue. 292

283

Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion) (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018).
285 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
286 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
287 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
288 This was one reason the DOJ had concluded that ALJs were inferior officers. See generally Dep’t
of Justice, Secretary of Education Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions: Memorandum Opinion
for the General Counsel Department of Education, 15 OP.S OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 8, 14
(1991).
289 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 509.
290 Trying to make sense of this footnote, Professor Kevin Stack suggested that Chief Justice Roberts
may have been trying to distinguish the Board members from ALJs by suggesting that Board members
perform adjudicative functions as well as executive and legislative functions, while ALJs perform only
adjudicative functions. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence after PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391,
2412 n.117 (2011). If so, Roberts could certainly have been clearer about his intention.
291 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050–51 n.1 (2018).
292 See Reply Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 15-16, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044
(2018) (No. 17-130).
284
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In contrast, the dissenting Justice Breyer addressed the issue head-on; 293
however, none of the Justices joined this part of his opinion. He said “Free
Enterprise Fund’s technical-sounding holding about ‘multilevel protection
from removal’ remain[s] potentially dramatic.” 294 He noted that Congress had
provided ALJs with at least two levels of removal protection—just what Free
Enterprise Fund had held to be unconstitutional. 295 Justice Breyer believed
that Congress had intended the ALJ removal provisions to remain in place
and, thus, would prefer the Court hold that ALJs were only employees to
avoid having to find the removal provisions unconstitutional. 296 Anticipating
the arguments, he said:
If the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s holding applies equally to the administrative law judges—
and I stress the “if”—then to hold that the administrative law judges are “Officers of the United
States” is, perhaps, to hold that their removal protections are unconstitutional. This would risk
transforming administrative law judges from independent adjudicators into dependent decisionmakers, serving at the pleasure of the Commission. 297

Stressing the “if” and “perhaps” in his statement, he pointed out that the
majority had disagreed with this conclusion in Free Enterprise Fund. 298 As
previously noted, the Court had offered three reasons why the Board members in Free Enterprise Fund were distinguishable from ALJs. The first of
those reasons is now gone; ALJs are officers. 299
The second is unworkable. 300 As noted earlier, the majority in Free Enterprise Fund both resurrected and altered the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction. In so doing, the Court rejected Morrison’s “so central–sufficiently deprives” test. 301 The Court’s new Myers–Humphrey’s distinction separates executive and quasi-legislative functions from quasi-adjudicatory functions,
suggesting removal limitations on quasi-adjudicative functions, and only
quasi-adjudicative functions, are valid. 302
This new Myers–Humphrey’s distinction might offer the functionalist
members of the Court a way to save the ALJ removal protections from constitutional infirmity; however, it is unlikely that this distinction will save the
day. One problem with the distinction is that it will be difficult to apply

293

Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2059–62 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2059 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 484).
295 Id. at 2060.
296 Id. at 2061–62.
297 Id. at 2060 (citing Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
540–42 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
298 Id. at 2060 (citing Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 506).
299 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2061 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10).
300 See id. at 2060 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012)).
301 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
302 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–55 (majority opinion).
294
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because the dividing line between functions is fuzzy at best. Few, if any,
agency officials perform only one function. For example, ALJs affect policy
and the Board members perform quasi-adjudicative functions. Further, since
Free Enterprise Fund was decided, two formalists have joined the Court, a
consideration that is explained in the next Section of this Article. 303 Hence,
while those wishing to save ALJ removal protection will proclaim that this
distinction alone should suffice, their cries will fall on deaf ears.
Finally, the third reason the Court in Free Enterprise Fund offered for
distinguishing ALJs relates to the strictness of the removal provisions on the
Board members. 304 ALJ removal provisions are less severe. Yet, the severity
of a for-cause removal provision simply cannot be the constitutional dividing
line. Either for-cause removal provisions are constitutional, or they are not.
B.

Two Formalists Join the Supreme Court

Since Free Enterprise Fund was decided, the composition of the Supreme Court has moved to the right. Justice Gorsuch replaced Justice Scalia,
and Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy. Both Justices Scalia and
Kennedy joined the majority in Free Enterprise Fund. Were their replacements more functionalist on this issue, ALJ removal provisions might be
safe. However, neither Justice Gorsuch nor Justice Kavanaugh is a functionalist. If anything, the two are at least as formalist as Justice Scalia, and certainly more formalist than Justice Kennedy. 305
1.

Justice Gorsuch

While still on the Tenth Circuit, Judge Gorsuch never addressed appointment or removal issues. 306 Justice Gorsuch joined the Supreme Court in

303

See discussion infra Part III.B.
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2061 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305 For an example of Justice Gorsuch’s formalist approach, see Oil States Energy Services, LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1386 (2018) (“Ceding to the political branches ground
they wish to take in the name of efficient government may seem like an act of judicial restraint. But
enforcing Article III isn’t about protecting judicial authority for its own sake. It’s about ensuring the people today and tomorrow enjoy no fewer rights against governmental intrusion than those who came before.”). Also, in Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018), Justice Gorsuch signed onto Justice Alito’s
dissenting opinion. Justice Alito would have held that the Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of an Article I court (The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces.). 138 S. Ct. at 2190 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court was indisputably part of the
Executive branch and the Constitution vests all judicial power, “every single drop of it,” in the Supreme
Court and other inferior Article III courts).
306 While on the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch briefly discussed the Recess Appointments Clause.
Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB, 765 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2014).
304
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2017. 307 Since joining the Court, he has signed on to the majority’s opinion
in Lucia, which dodged the removal issue, but did hold that SEC ALJs are
inferior officers, not employees.
The only other Supreme Court opinion that might provide some insight
into his approach to appointments issues is Oil States Energy Services, LLC
v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC. 308 The issue in this case was whether the
Patent and Trademark Office could conduct patent reviews without violating
Article III. 309 The majority held that it could. 310 Justice Gorsuch dissented,
arguing that a political appointee could not resolve the dispute; an Article III
judge was constitutionally required. 311 He reasoned that political appointees,
unlike Article III judges, were not independent. 312
While Justice Gorsuch’s dissent does not address removal or ALJs specifically, it does offer some insight. First, he approaches these issues from a
formalist perspective. Second, he views independence of adjudicators as critical for fair, impartial decision-making.
2.

Justice Kavanaugh

In comparison, Justice Kavanaugh’s approach to removal is less opaque.
Two cases are instructive. First, when Free Enterprise Fund was before the
D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented. 313 The majority quoted his
dissenting opinion twice, agreeing that the agency’s structure lacked historical precedent and unduly expanded legislative power. 314 Second, he recently
reiterated his constitutional reservations about novel agency structures. In
2016, the D.C. Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Board (“CFPB”), an independent agency established in
2010 and headed by a single director. 315 That director was removable only for
cause, specifically “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”
during a five-year term. 316 Independent agencies are more typically headed

307

Press Release, The White House, Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch Sworn-in at the White
House (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/supreme-court-justice-neil-gorsuch-swornwhite-house/.
308 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
309 Id. at 1370.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1386 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
312 Id.
313 Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
314 Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500, 505–06 (2010).
315 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated, No. 15-1177,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), reinstated in part en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
316 Id. at 15 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012)).
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by multi-member bodies. 317 The issue for the court was whether this singledirector headed agency structure was constitutional. 318 In Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court held that Congress could limit the President’s ability
to remove the heads of independent agencies, so the removal provision appeared constitutional. 319
However, a mortgage lender subject to a $109 million CFPB enforcement order challenged the order’s validity by, in part, challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. 320 A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
found the structure to be unconstitutional. 321 Judge Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion. He framed the issue as whether the court should extend
Humphrey’s Executor’s holding to a single-director independent agency. 322
His answer was no, stating that this “first of its kind . . . historical anomaly” 323
violated Article II of the Constitution. 324
Kavanaugh noted that the text of the Constitution alone did not resolve
the issue (which is true in every removal case), so he turned to “history and
tradition.” 325 The history and tradition demonstrated that other similarly
structured independent agencies 326 could not serve as historical precedent because those agencies were created recently and were “constitutionally contested.” 327 Kavanaugh pointed out that those agencies differed from the CFPB
because they did not have the power to bring law enforcement actions against
private citizens, a “core” executive power.328
Importantly, Kavanaugh believed the CFPB director was “the single
most powerful official in the entire United States Government . . . when
measured in terms of unilateral power.” 329 Finally, Kavanaugh suggested that
safeguards traditionally used to control agencies—unfettered removal for executive agencies and multi-member boards for independent agencies—
helped protect individual liberty by preventing arbitrary decision-making and
abuse of power, and by fostering more deliberative decision-making. 330 In
317

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
319 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
320 PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 7.
321 Id. at 12.
322 Id. at 7. Judge Henderson dissented from this part of the decision because there was no need to
reach the constitutional issue; the petitioners were entitled to full relief based solely on the statutory challenge. Id. at 57–58 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323 Id. at 17 (majority opinion).
324 Id. at 16.
325 Id. at 21–22 (citing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014)).
326 There are currently three other independent agencies with this type of structure: the Social Security Administration, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. PHH Corp.,
839 F.3d at 18. One former agency also had this structure: the Independent Counsel. Id. at 20.
327 Id. at 19–20.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 16.
330 Id. at 26.
318
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sum, he concluded that the single-director independent agency structure was
unconstitutional because there was no historical practice for it, and the omitted safeguards impacted individual liberty. 331 The government moved for rehearing en banc, which was granted. 332
The full court reversed, holding that the for-cause limitation was consistent with Article II. 333 The majority analyzed the constitutionality of the
removal provision by addressing two questions: first, whether the “means of
independence [was] permissible;” 334 and second, whether the type of functions the agency performed required independence, which should be protected by for-cause removal. 335
Answering the first question, the majority found the CFPB’s removal
provision to be identical to the removal provision the Supreme Court had
approved in Humphrey’s Executor. 336 In both cases, the officer could be fired
only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 337 Such a
“mild constraint on removal” contrasted with “the cumbersome or encroaching removal restriction[]” in Free Enterprise Fund, which the Court held to
be unconstitutional. 338 Additionally, the majority noted that Congress had not
aggrandized itself with the CFPB’s removal limitation, unlike in Myers and
Bowsher. 339 Further, Congress had not added an additional for-cause layer, as
it had done in Free Enterprise Fund. 340 The majority concluded by noting
that “[t]he Supreme Court has never struck down a statute conferring the
standard for-cause [removal] protection at issue here.” 341
Answering the second question, the majority turned to a consistent
theme in these removal protection arguments: the importance of independence. The majority reasoned that when an agency or official needs to be independent from the executive to function properly, for-cause removal limitations do not impermissibly burden the President’s Article II powers. 342
331

Id. at 36. Judge Henderson dissented from the panel’s constitutional holding on the ground that
it was unnecessary and, thus, inappropriate under the doctrine of avoidance to reach the removal-power
question. Id. at 56–60 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She changed her opinion
upon full en banc review. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(en banc).
332 PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 77.
333 Id. at 84.
334 Id. at 78.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 77, 93.
337 Id. at 78 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012)); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
619 (1935) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)).
338 PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 78.
339 Id. at 78 (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926)).
340 Id. at 93 (noting the “onerous” provision at issue in Free Enterprise Fund).
341 Id. at 78.
342 Id. at 79 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 n.30, 686–96 (1988); Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631).
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Independence is essential for the CFPB to function as a financial consumer
protection agency, similar to the FTC. 343 Pointing to the new Myers–Humphrey’s distinction, the majority noted that the CFPB did not exercise “core
executive functions, such as those entrusted to a Secretary of State or other
Cabinet officer who . . . must directly answer to the President’s will.” 344 Or,
as the concurrence put it, “[R]emoval restrictions of officers performing adjudicatory functions intrude far less on the separation of powers than removal
restrictions of officers who perform purely executive functions.” 345 Therefore, the removal limitation was constitutional. 346
Removal opinions are not for the faint at heart. Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent from the full court’s opinion begins almost ninety pages in
and continues for thirty-six more pages. 347 He repeats much of the reasoning
from his panel opinion: the single-director independent agency has no historical support and is “a gross departure from settled historical practice,” 348 the
director’s powers are executive and “enormous,” 349 and the President has no
ability to control a one-person director that the President cannot remove,
which substantially diminishes presidential power. 350 He concludes that
“[u]nder Article II, an independent agency that exercises substantial executive power may not be headed by a single Director.” 351 His formalist and cautious approach to removal issues demonstrates that he is unlikely to approve
of the multi-track, for-cause ALJ removal protections as a Supreme Court
Justice.
IV. EVALUATING ALJ REMOVAL CONSTITUTIONALITY & FIXES
The cases described in Part III show the Supreme Court alternating between fully protecting the President’s removal power to accepting significant
limitations on that power and back again. This Part explains why the ALJ
multi-track, dual-removal protections violate the Constitution. While individually, each for-cause layer is constitutional, collectively they fail. This
Part then evaluates possible fixes.

343 Id. at 94 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687, 691 n.30; Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353; Humphrey’s Ex’r,
295 U.S. at 631).
344 PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 84.
345 Id. at 115 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
346 Id. at 84 (majority opinion). The majority rejected PHH’s argument that the single director model
changed the analysis. Id. at 96.
347 See id. at 164–200 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
348 Id. at 166.
349 PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 166.
350 Id. at 166–67 (contrasting independent multi-member agencies in which an incoming president
can at least select the chair).
351 Id. at 167.
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The ALJ Removal Scheme is Unconstitutional

ALJs are inferior officers. Removal limitations on inferior officers are
constitutional. In Perkins and Morrison, the Court held that Congress can
limit the ability of department heads to remove their inferior officers, even
executive inferior officers. 352 However, in Hennen and Parsons, the Court
was clear that when Congress wishes to protect inferior officers from at-will
removal, Congress must include an express removal provision; one will not
be implied. 353
Removal limitations on principal officers are trickier. They may be constitutional depending on the officer’s powers. In Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, the Court held that for-cause removal provisions on executive officers
are unconstitutional, for-cause removal provisions on quasi-legislative or
policymaking officers may be constitutional, and for-cause removal provisions on quasi-adjudicatory officials are constitutional, especially when the
purpose of the removal provision is to ensure the independence of the protected officer. 354
Additionally, and irrespective of whether the provision protects inferior
or principal officers, removal provisions in which Congress retains removal
power for itself are per se unconstitutional. 355 And, for-cause removal limitations must be reasonable (traditional?), not excessive. 356 These are the rules
regarding the constitutionality of single for-cause removal provisions.
The rule (note the singular here) regarding the constitutionality of multiple for-cause removal provisions is much easier to articulate: under Free
Enterprise Fund they are unconstitutional, even if each removal provision
would be constitutional independently. 357 Multiple for-cause removal provisions are unconstitutional, according to the Court, because they interfere with
the President’s ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.358 The
President must retain some ability to remove a recalcitrant inferior officer,
whether the President has the power to remove that inferior officer directly
or has the power to remove the principal officer overseeing the inferior officer, as in Morrison.
From these rules comes the inevitable conclusion that no one wants to
hear: that ALJ multi-track removal provisions violate the Constitution, even
though each provision would be constitutional independently. Here is why.
First, ALJs are inferior officers who have traditional, for-cause removal

352

See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1. But see Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958)
(limiting the removal of a principal officer when no such provision was included in the statute).
354 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
355 See discussion supra Parts III.A.1 & III.A.2.
356 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
357 See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (discussing Free Enterprise Fund).
358 See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010).
353
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protection. Their department or agency appoints them. 359 As previously
noted, Congress can limit a department’s or agency’s ability to remove its
ALJs so long as the for-cause removal provision is not excessive and Congress has not retained a role in the removal process for itself. 360 Here, the
removal protections are traditional and do not involve Congress. Moreover,
ALJs are quasi-adjudicators, and Congress included for-cause removal provisions specifically to further ALJ independence and impartiality. 361 Hence,
this first level of removal protection is not only constitutional, it is laudable.
Second, the majority of ALJs work for independent agencies. 362 These
Independent ALJs have a second layer of removal protection because the independent agency heads are themselves typically protected from at-will removal. 363 Pursuant to the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction (original or as
amended), Congress can limit the removal of these agency heads so long as
they exercise quasi-adjudicatory functions (and perhaps quasi-legislative
functions, but that is a bit unclear). As with ALJs, Congress includes removal
limitations on the heads of the independent agencies to further their independence from the President. 364 While the for-cause removal limitation for
each agency head would need to be examined to confirm that it is not excessive, Congress did not retain a role in the removal process, and the official
performs quasi-adjudicative or quasi-legislative functions, so this second
level of removal protection is also constitutional.
359 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105 (“Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary
. . . ”), 556(b)(3) (directing ALJs who preside at agency adjudications to be appointed pursuant to § 3105)
(2012). See also Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018). In this order, President
Trump changed the process agencies used to select their ALJs. The prior process involved another agency,
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), identifying three qualified candidates from which the agency
could hire. The E.O. takes OPM out of the process entirely.
360 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
361 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012) (providing that “[a]n action may be taken against an administrative
law judge appointed under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge
is employed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . ”).
Note that the Merit Systems Protection Board, “for the purpose of section 7521 . . . may investigate,
prescribe regulations, appoint advisory committees as necessary, recommend legislation, subpena [sic]
witnesses and records, and pay witness fees as established for the courts of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. §
1305 (2012). Congress also provided that ALJ compensation was to be determined based on tenure rather
than performance. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 5372, 4301(2)(D) (2012).
362 U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: ALJS BY AGENCY (2018),
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency. The National Labor Relations Board has thirty-four. Id. Indeed, more than 1,600 ALJs work for the Social Security Administration (SSA). Id. The SSA is an independent agency whose head can be removed from the
office only for cause. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2012). See generally Mathew B. Tully, A Pending Supreme
Court Case Calls Constitutionality of Administrative Law Judges’ Decisions into Question,
FEDSMITH.COM (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.fedsmith.com/2017/10/23/pending-supreme-court-casecalls-constitutionality-administrative-law-judges-decisions-question/.
363 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935).
364 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 707 (1988); Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 490–91 (2011).
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While divided they stand, united they fall. 365 Multiple for-cause removal
protections violate the Constitution because they prevent the President from
overseeing those who work for him. 366 Here, there are multiple levels of removal protection, which prevent the President from exercising direct or indirect control over a poorly performing ALJ. For example, imagine a different
world from the one today. Imagine a president who is above reproach and an
SEC that is misbehaving. If an SEC ALJ drank one too many cocktails before
every adjudication, and the SEC Commissioners chose not to try to fire the
ALJ (assume political reasons for this choice), the President could not do so
either. Moreover, the President could not remove the SEC Commissioners
either.
There may be one very small reason for optimism. ALJs who work for
executive agencies (Executive ALJs) do not have this second level of forcause protection within their own agency. Hence, their removal protection
possibly would be constitutional because of basic math: one good, two bad.
However, Executive ALJs, like Independent ALJs, cannot be fired easily. If an agency wants to fire an inebriated ALJ, the agency must bring a
formal adjudication before an MSPB ALJ. Like the agency ALJ, the MSPB
ALJ has for-cause removal protection: level one. 367 The members of the
MSPB review their ALJ’s decision. The MSPB is an independent agency
whose members also have for-cause removal protection: level two. 368 All
ALJs, Independent and Executive ALJs, are protected by this process. Thus,
all ALJs are protected by this dual for-cause protection system.
To be sure, this dual for-cause system of protection is separate from the
for-cause removal provisions protecting ALJs. In other words, there are not
three levels of protection for Executive ALJs, nor four levels of protection
for Independent ALJs. Rather, there are two separate, parallel tracks of protection. This parallel track similarly prevents the President from exercising
direct or indirect control over a poorly performing ALJ. Assuming an agency
tries to fire its ALJ, the MSPB ALJ might not find good cause (maybe she
likes a cocktail or two as well), and the MSPB accepts its ALJ’s decision.
Hence, just like in the first hypothetical, our soused ALJ remains in office,
this time over the agency and the President’s objections, and the President
cannot remove either the MSPB ALJ or the MSPB members.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court remedied the constitutional
infirmity by severing the unconstitutional removal provision protecting

365

Cf. AESOP, The Four Oxen and The Lion, in AESOP’S FABLES (1867), http://etc.usf.edu/lit2go/35/
aesops-fables/392/the-four-oxen-and-the-lion/.
366 Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495–96 (2010). But
see David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1191–95 (2016) (arguing
that whatever the doctrinal problems with removal, ALJs are too traditional to find unconstitutional now).
367 See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 486–87; MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 619–
20 (2d Cir. 2004).
368 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
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inferior officers (the members of the Board). 369 The statutes protecting ALJs
from at-will removal cannot simply be severed; they would have to be declared invalid. And, the implications would be staggering and destructive.
First, the impact would be substantial. There were only five board members in Free Enterprise Fund. In contrast, there are 1,584 ALJs in over
twenty-five agencies. 370 ALJs have served as the cornerstone of the administrative adjudicatory system for many years, serving many regulated entities
and agencies. ALJs have served this important function for so long that it
may seem counterintuitive to find their removal unconstitutional, especially
when historical practice has been used to support the constitutionality of
“novel” agency structures. 371
Second, the effect would be detrimental. Quasi-adjudicators, like ALJs,
are arguably protected from executive removal for good reason: to promote
independence. As noted, before the APA was enacted, there was considerable
concern that hearing examiners did not exercise independent judgment, both
because they were required to perform prosecutorial and investigative functions in addition to their judicial work, 372 and because they were subordinate
to the agency heads. 373 Congress intentionally included provisions in the APA
to help ensure hearing examiners’ independence. 374 Congress rightly concluded that effective adjudication requires that litigants believe the process is
fair and the decision-makers impartial. 375 Thus, ALJs must be free to adjudicate without threat of retaliation. 376 Protecting ALJs from arbitrary and retaliatory removal furthers independence and impartiality. 377 One could easily
369

Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
371 See, e.g., PPH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
372 See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37–38 (1950).
373 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (citing Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953)).
374 For example, when conducting a hearing, an ALJ cannot be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of employees or agents who perform investigative or prosecutorial functions for the
agency. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012). Nor may an ALJ consult any person or party, including other agency
officials, concerning a fact at issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1). Moreover, and at issue here, ALJs can be removed only for good cause
established and determined by the MSPB after a formal adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). Finally, Congress ensured that ALJ compensation is also free from executive control. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 5372,
4301(2)(D).
375 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that biased decision-making is constitutionally
unacceptable, especially in a system that “‘endeavor[s] to prevent even the probability of unfairness’”)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). See also Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 14
(1st Cir. 2008). After all, “due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial
or quasi-judicial capacities.” Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).
376 A former ALJ alleged she felt pressured to rule in favor of the SEC and that she was told to work
under the presumption that the defendants were guilty until proven innocent. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins
with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-winswith-in-house-judges-1430965803.
377 See Butz, 438 U.S. at 514 (considering whether agency employees had immunity from prosecution for allegedly ultra vires acts).
370
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say that ALJ removal protection is necessary for the system to function as it
should. If a court were to invalidate the ALJ removal protection layer, the
independence and impartiality of administrative hearings would be lost. The
system would return to the pre-APA days, when hearing examiners were considered mere instruments of their agencies.
In sum, the potential repercussions for invalidating the ALJs’ for-cause
removal provisions are significantly greater than were the repercussions for
invalidating the removal provision that applied to a board with just five members. The question, then, is whether the Court can protect ALJ independence
within constitutional constraints. The next Section addresses that question.
B.

Evaluating Potential Fixes

Assuming that the Supreme Court is likely to hold 5 U.S.C. § 7521 unconstitutional, and that protecting ALJ independence within constitutional
constraints is a worthy endeavor, then the question is, how might the Court
resolve this mess? There is no perfect resolution; however, there are three
potential options. First, the removal protection that applies to all civil service
employees might cover ALJs. Second, the Court could narrow Humphrey’s
Executor to hold that Congress can limit a President’s power to remove principal officers who exercise quasi-adjudicatory powers exclusively. And third,
the Court could overrule Humphrey’s Executor entirely and hold that Congress cannot limit a President’s power to remove any principal officer. This
Section explores the pluses and minuses of each option next.
1.

Civil Service Removal Protection

First, if the Court were to hold 5 U.S.C. § 7521 unconstitutional, it is
unclear whether ALJs would then be protected under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 378 All civil servants enjoy a form of removal protection
that is less robust than the protection ALJs enjoy. Specifically, when the government fires or suspends a civil servant, she may appeal the decision to the
MSPB within thirty days. 379 After an informal hearing, an administrative
judge (“AJ”) renders an initial decision. 380 The AJ will uphold the agency’s
decision to terminate or suspend an employee for “unacceptable

378

Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (now codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (2012)).
5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(1) (2018). The Board maintains a website for employees to complete
online forms to file a claim: https://e-appeal.mspb.gov/. The contents of the form are identified in the
agency’s regulations. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.24(a).
380 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111 (2018).
379
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performance” 381 so long as the decision is supported by “substantial evidence.” 382 Either party may then appeal the AJ’s initial decision to the MSPB,
which determines whether the AJ’s decision contained “erroneous findings
of material fact,” was “based on an erroneous interpretation [or application]
of statute or regulation,” or failed to address “[n]ew and material evidence . . . that . . . was not available when the record closed.” 383
This process does not differ substantially from the process used in cases
of ALJ removal. When an agency wishes to fire or suspend its ALJ, the
agency, rather than the ALJ, must file a complaint with the MSPB. 384 The
MSPB will then hold a formal hearing before an MSPB ALJ. 385 The MSPB
ALJ “will authorize the agency to take a disciplinary action, and will specify
the penalty to be imposed, only after a finding of good cause as required by
5 U.S.C. 7521 has been made.” 386 Section 7521 does not define “good cause,”
but the term is traditionally understood to mean “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.” 387 The MSPB will uphold the agency’s decision to terminate or suspend the ALJ for cause so long as the decision is
supported by substantial evidence. 388 The process for appealing the ALJ’s
decision is identical to the process for appealing the AJ’s decision. 389
Thus, the primary difference between the two processes is the basis for
the disciplinary action: civil servants can be removed if the agency can prove
by substantial evidence that the employee exhibited “unacceptable performance,” while ALJs can be removed only if the agency can prove by substantial evidence that the ALJ exhibited “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.” While “unacceptable performance” is certainly a
lower standard than “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,”
it is still a standard that would prevent removal of adjudicators for retaliatory
reasons, thereby protecting impartiality. For example, AJs, who adjudicate
381

5 U.S.C. § 4303(a) (2017).
5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(i) (2018). Substantial evidence is defined in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p) (“The
degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons might disagree. This is a lower
standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence.”). If the action was due to any other legitimate
reason, then the standard is a preponderance of the evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii). A preponderance of the evidence is defined in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q) (“The degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more
likely to be true than untrue.”).
383 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a), (b), (d) (2018). See, e.g., Weaver v. Dep’t of Navy, 2 M.S.P.B. 297, 299
(1980), review denied, 669 F.2d 613, 613 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
384 5 C.F.R. § 1201.137(b) (2018).
385 5 C.F.R. § 1201.140(a)(1) (2018).
386 Id. § 1201.140(b).
387 See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010)
(quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)).
388 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
389 5 C.F.R. § 1201.140(a)(2) (2018) (noting that the review provisions in Subpart C apply to the
MSPB review).
382
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the vast number of “informal,” or Type B and C adjudications, 390 have civilservant removal protection. They view themselves as independent of their
agencies, and some argue that the process seems to be working. 391 Thus, were
the Supreme Court to declare 5 U.S.C. § 7521 unconstitutional, the removal
protection in 5 U.S.C. § 4303 may be sufficiently protective to ensure ALJ
independence while simultaneously permitting greater presidential oversight.
More likely, however, the Supreme Court will not substitute a less stringent removal protection for an unconstitutional one. If for-cause removal
protections violate the Constitution because they tie the President’s hands,
then making those protections a little less protective would not seem to remedy the constitutional infirmity. Either the President has the power to fire
those who work for him, or he does not.
2.

Narrowing Humphrey’s Executor

Second, the Court could significantly narrow Humphrey’s Executor by
holding that it prevents Congress from limiting the President’s power to remove officers who exercise adjudicatory powers only, whether they be principal or inferior officers, and whether they be executive or independent officers.
Professor Richard Pierce makes this argument. 392 He notes that Myers
can be read narrowly as expressing the Supreme Court’s concern about congressional aggrandizement rather than as support “for the broad proposition
that Congress cannot limit in any way the power of the president to remove
any executive officer.” 393 In Myers, the Court specifically addressed the President’s power to remove territorial judges, noting that the President “could
not properly exercise any supervision or control [over such judges] after their
appointment and confirmation.” 394 Further, the Court specifically refused to
decide whether the President must have the power to remove officers who
have only adjudicatory responsibilities because the issue was not before the
Court. 395 Professor Pierce argues that Myers is consistent with his view that

390 See Michael Asimow, Best Practices for Evidentiary Hearings Outside the Administrative Procedure Act, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3) (dividing informal hearings
into two types based on the degree of procedures offered by each).
391 See E-mail from Michael Asimow, Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, and Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law, to author (Sept. 18, 2018, 5:51 PM) (on file with author).
392 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Court Should Change the Scope of the Removal Power by Adopting a
Pure Functional Approach, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 16–17) (arguing
that the President should have the power to remove any officer who makes policy decisions, but not the
power to remove those who adjudicate disputes between individuals and the government).
393 Id. (manuscript at 4).
394 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 157 (1926).
395 Id. at 157–58.
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“the Court has always recognized that officers who perform solely adjudicatory powers, as distinguished from ‘quasi judicial’ powers, can be insulated
from potential plenary control by the president and can be insulated from at
will removal by the president.” 396
Turning to Humphrey’s Executor, Professor Pierce urges a narrow reading of that case as well. Specifically, he notes that when Humphrey’s Executor was decided, the FTC “had no power to issue rules or to make policy
decisions on behalf of the government.” 397 Rather, it had the power to adjudicate disputes (quasi-judicial power) and to advise Congress on the need for
legislation (quasi-legislative power). 398 Hence, Humphrey’s Executor held
only that Congress can limit the President’s ability to remove officers who
do not make policy decisions.
Finally, Professor Pierce points to Wiener, in which the Supreme Court
implied a for-cause removal provision for a member of the War Claims Tribunal. Because the tribunal’s sole function was adjudication, 399 the Court
concluded that Congress wanted this adjudicative body to be free from outside pressure. 400 Hence, the President was unable to remove a member without cause.
Professor Pierce suggests that these three cases support a functional understanding of Congress’s ability to limit the President’s removal power. 401
Congress may limit the President’s power to remove officers who perform
only adjudicative functions (and perhaps quasi-legislative, but that is unclear). But Congress may not limit the President’s ability to remove officers
who perform policymaking functions. 402
Professor Pierce’s proposal has appeal. He brings coherence to an incoherent body of law. Moreover, his proposal would protect both ALJs from
retaliatory removal, and independent agency heads who solely adjudicate,
such as the members of the MSPB, perhaps. However, his approach suffers
the same problem as the Myers–Humphrey’s distinction: many agencies perform adjudicatory as well as other functions and the lines are simply not that
clear. Perhaps the answer is that the line is at least clear enough to protect
ALJs, and that is enough.

396 E-mail from Richard Pierce, Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University
Law School, to author (Sept. 11, 2018, 8:04 AM) (on file with author).
397 Pierce, supra note 392 (manuscript at 5).
398 Id.
399 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355 (1958).
400 Id. at 356.
401 Pierce, supra note 392 (manuscript at 13–15).
402 Id. (manuscript at 8) (“The Court has never upheld a for cause limit on the president’s power to
remove an officer who has the power to make policy decisions.”).
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Overturning Humphrey’s Executor

Third, the Court could reverse Humphrey’s Executor 403 entirely and hold
that provisions that limit a President’s ability to remove a principal officer
are unconstitutional, regardless of whether that officer works for an independent agency or an executive agency, and regardless of the type of power
that officer exercises. This solution would leave in place the Court’s holdings
in Perkins and Morrison: Congress can place removal limitations on departments that appoint inferior officers so long as the President retains removal
power over the principal officer supervising the inferior officer. 404 Further,
this solution would respect the Court’s holding in Free Enterprise Fund:
multiple removal provisions violate the Constitution. 405 Surprisingly, the solution would even leave the Court’s holding in Morrison unscathed, assuming the independent counsel actually was an inferior officer: Congress can
limit the department’s ability to remove an inferior officer, even one who
performs purely executive functions. 406
If the Court were to adopt this solution to the ALJs’ multi-track removal
provisions, it would find 5 U.S.C. § 7521 constitutional. This statute protects
inferior officers exercising quasi-adjudicatory powers from removal by their
department heads. 407 Protecting ALJs from at-will removal furthers the twin
goals of ensuring ALJ independence and providing unbiased hearings. ALJs
would be free to make their findings based on the evidence, not the preferences of their employer or their fear of retaliation.
Further, pursuant to this solution, the Court would reject for-cause removal protections preventing the President from removing the heads of agencies, including the independent agencies. Thus, the members of the MSPB,
among other independent agency heads, would no longer be protected from
at-will removal.
One potential problem with this solution is that some, but not all, Article
I judges are considered principal officers. 408 Whether every Article I judge is
403

Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), should also be reversed, but for a different reason.
The statute at issue in Wiener did not include a removal provision. Id. at 352. The Supreme Court implied
one, holding that removal provisions are never implied. Id. at 356. It did this despite its earlier cases,
Hennen and Parsons. Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 239 (1839) (stating that “[p]owers are only implied
from necessity” if there is a “cogent reason” to do so). See also Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324,
343 (1897).
404 See discussion supra Parts III.A.1–2.
405 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
406 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
407 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
408 For example, Congress impliedly concluded that bankruptcy judges were inferior officers and
vested the courts of appeal with appointment power. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012). In contrast, Congress
likely concluded that veterans court judges and judges in the federal court of claims were principal officers
because the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, appoints them. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(b)
(2016); 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). To be sure, the method of appointment is not determinative of officer
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an inferior or principal officer would require analysis that is beyond the scope
of this Article. Recall that Edmond v. United States 409 defined inferior officers
as those subordinate to principal officers.410 Subordinate means having one’s
“work . . . directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the Senate’s advice and consent.” 411
At least one scholar has suggested that Article I judges would be inferior
officers under Edmond. 412 In any event, if any of the Article I judges are principal officers, then this option would remove their current for-cause protection; however, impartiality and unbiased decision-making are as important
for Article I tribunals as they are for agency adjudications.
There will be outcry about this option. Overruling precedent should not
be done lightly. Moreover, Congress intended the independent agencies to be
independent of the President for good reason. And with the President in office today, such protection may seem particularly essential. Arguably, however, Humphrey’s Executor and the Constitution conflict. Either the President is vested with executive power and the responsibility to control those
helping him execute that power, or he is not. The Constitution provides the
former. And the Constitution does not change based on who is in office: even
if the current President has a fondness for the words, “You’re fired.”
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the dual-track, multiple for-cause removal provisions
protecting ALJs from at-will removal are unconstitutional according to the
Supreme Court’s removal cases because, in short, two is too many. In Free
Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court held that multiple levels of tenure protection violate Article II and separation of powers. 413 Yet, the repercussions
of invalidating the ALJs’ for-cause removal protections would be significantly greater and more destructive to the administrative state than were the
repercussions for invalidating a removal provision that applied to a board
with just five members.
The Court might refuse to extend its holding in Free Enterprise Fund to
inferior officers exercising quasi-adjudicatory power, like ALJs. 414 After all,
in footnote ten, Chief Justice Roberts specifically tried to distinguish ALJs

status because the Constitution permits Congress to vest the power to appointment inferior officers in
multiple bodies, including the president and the courts of law.
409 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
410 Id. at 652.
411 Id.
412 See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 292–95 (2008) (arguing all lower court judges other than those on the Supreme Court could be considered inferior officers and appointed by the circuit courts).
413 Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
414 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
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based on the type of power they wield. 415 Similarly, Justice Breyer in Free
Enterprise Fund and Lucia expressed concern that applying Free Enterprise
Fund’s holding to ALJs would significantly disrupt the administrative
state. 416
However, disrupting the administrative state plays right into the conservative agenda. 417 Indeed, President Trump’s litmus test for nominating
federal judges was whether they are willing to rein in “what conservatives
call ‘the administrative state.’” 418 Conservatives might very well welcome the
“destabilize[ation of] the modern federal government.” 419 And, given the recent appointments of Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh, their goal just
moved one very important step closer to fruition.

415
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